University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Edward H. Levi Speeches

Faculty Scholarship

11-6-1975

Testimony of the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of
the United States before the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities.
10:00 AM. Thursday November 6, 1975. Russell Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C.
Edward H. Levi
EdwardHirsch.Levi@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech

Recommended Citation
Levi, Edward H., "Testimony of the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of the United States before
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities.
10:00 AM. Thursday November 6, 1975. Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C." (1975). Edward
H. Levi Speeches. 6.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech/6

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Edward H. Levi Speeches by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

'J9~
L
v

TESTIMONY
OF
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

10:00 A.M.
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1975
RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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I am here today in response to a request from the Committee
to discuss the relationship between electronic surveillance and
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
correctly,

th~

If I remember

original request was that I place before the

Committee the philosophical or jurisprudential framewory. relevant to this relationship which lawyers, those with executive
responsibilities or discretion, and lawmakers, viewing this
complex field, ought to keep in mind.

If this sounds vague

and general and perhaps useless, I can only ask for indulgence.
My first concern when I received the request was that any
remarks I might be able to make would be so general as not
to

~e

helpful to the Committee.

But I want to be as helpful

to the Committee as I can be.
The area with which the Committee is conc~rned is
. important one.

a most

In my view, the development of the law in this

area has not been satisfactory, although there are reasons
why the law has developed as it has.

Improvement of the law,

which in part means its clarification, will not be easy.
it is a most important venture.

Yet

In a talk before the American

Bar Association last August, I discussed some of the aspects
of the legal framework.
Justice, I concluded this

Speaking for the Department of
porti~~

of the talk with the

observation and commitment that "we have very much in mind
the necessity to determine what procedures through legislation,
court action or

j

exec~tive

processes will best serve the

-2-'
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national interest, including, of course, the protection of
constitutional rights."
I begin then with an apology for the general nature of
my remarks.
itself

i~

This will be due in part to the nature of the law

this area.

But I should state at-the outset there

are other reasons as well.

In any area, and possibly in this

6ne more than most, legal principles gain meaning through an
interaction with the facts.

Thus, the factual situations to

be imagined are of enormous significance.
As this Committee well knows, some of the factual situations to be imagined in this area are not only of a sensitive
nature but also of a changing nature.

Therefore, I aQ limited

in Fhat I can say about them, not only because they are
sensitive: but also because a lawyer's imagination about
future scientific developments carries its own warnings of
ignorance.

This is a point worth making when one tries to

develop appropriate safeguards for the future.
There is an additional professional restriction upon me
which I am sure the Committee will appreciate.

The Department

of Justice has under active criminal investigation various
activities which mayor may not have been illegal.

In addi-

tion, the Department through its own attorneys, or private
attorneys specially hired, is representing present or former
government employees in civil suits which have been brought
against them for activities in the course of official conduct.
These circumstances naturally impose some limitation upon what

J
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-3it is appropriate for me to say in this forum.

I ought not

give specific conclusory opinions as to matters under criminal
investigation or in litigation.

I can only hope that what I

have to say may nevertheless be of some value to the Committee
in its search for constructive solutions.
I do realize there has to be some factual base, however
unfocused it may at times have to be," to give this discussion
meaning.

Therefore, as a beginning, I propose to recount

something of the history of the Department's position and
practice with respect to the use of electronic surveillance,
both for telephone wiretapping and for trespassory placement
of microphones.
As I read the history, going back to 1931 and undoubtedly
prior to that time, except for an interlude between i928 and
1931 and for two months in 1940, the policy of. the Department
of Justice has been that electronic surveillance could be
employed without a warrant in certain circumstances.
In 1928 the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States~1
held that wiretapping was not within the coverage of the
Fourth Amendment.

Attorney General Sargent had issued an

order earlier in the same year prohibiting what was then known
as the Bureau of Investigation from engaging in any telephone
wiretapping for any reason.

Soon after the order was issued,

the Prohibition Unit was transferred to the Department as a
new Bureau.

Because of the nature of its work and the fact

that the Unit had previously engaged in telephone wiretapping,

*-,.

277 U.S. 468.

-4-
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in January 1931, Attorney General William D. Mitchell directed
that a study be made to determine whether telephone wiretapping should be permitted and, if so, under what circumstances.
The Attorney General determined that in the meantime the
Bureaus

~ithin

the Department could engage

~n

telephone wire-

tapping upon the personal approval of the bureau chief after
consultation with the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the case.

The policy during this period was to allow wiretap-

ping only with respect to the telephones of syndicated bootleggers, where the agent had probable cause to believe the
telephone was being used for liquor operations.

The Bureaus

were instructed not to tap telephones of public officials and
other persons not directly engaged in the liquor business.
In December 1931, Attorney General William Mitchell expanded
the previous authority to include "exceptional cases where the
crimes are substantial and serious, and the necessity is
great and

[the bureau chief and ele Assistant Attorney General]

are satisfied that the persons whose wires are to be tapped
are of the criminal type."
During the rest of the thirties it appears that the
Department's policy concerning telephone wiretapping generally
conformed to the guidelines adopted by Attorney General William
Mitchell.

Telephone wiretapping was limited to cases involv-

ing the safety of the victim (as in kidnappings), location
and apprehension of "desperate" criminals, and other cases

~oo

-5considered to be of major law enforcement importance, such as
espionage and sabctage.
In December 1937, however, in the first Nardone case ~/
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, and applied Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 to law enforcement
officers, thus rejecting the Department's argument that it
did not so apply.

Although the Court read the Act to cover

only wire interceptions where there had also been disclosure
in court or to the public, the decision undoubtedly had its
impact upon the Department's estimation of the value of te1ephone wiretapping as an investigative technique.

In the second

**/ in December 1939, the Act was read to bar the
Nardone case-use in court not only of the overheard evidence, but also of
the fruits of that evidence.

Possibly for this reason, and

also because of public ,concern over telephone wiretapping,
on March 15, 1940', Attorney General Robert Jackson imposed a
total ban on its use by the Department.

This ban lasted about

two months ..
On May 21, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt iisued a
memorandum to the Attorney General stating his view that
electronic surveillance would pe proper under the Constitution
where "grave matters involving defense of the nation" were
involved.

The President autllorized and directed the Attorney

General "to secure information by listening devices [directed
~Nardone

v United States, 302 U.S. 379.

~/Nurdone

v United States, 308

U.S~

338.

-6-
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at] the (!;onversation or other conununi.'cations of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of
the United States, "including suspected spies."

The Attorney

General was requested "to limit these investigations so
conducted to a minimum and to limit them inspfar as possible
as to aliens:"

Although the President's memorandum did not

use the term "trespassory microphone surveillance," the
1a~guage

was sufficiently broad to include that practice, and

the Department construed it as an authorization to conduct
trespassory microphone surveillances as well as telephone wiretapping in national security cases.
President's actioa was later

The authority for the

confir~ed

by an opinion by

Assistant Solicitor General Charles Fahy who advised the
Attorney General that electronic surveillance could be conducted where matters affected the security of the nation.
On July 17, 1946, Attorney General Torn C. Clark sent
President Truman a letter reminding" him that President
Roosevelt had authorized and directed Attorney General Jackson
to

approv~

"listening devices [directed at] the conversation

of other communications of persons suspected of subversive
activities against the Government of the United States,
including suspected spies" and that the directive had been
followed by Attorneys General Robert Jackson and Francis
Biddle.

Attorney general Clark recommended that the directive

"be continued in force" in view of the "increase in subversive

302
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activities" and "a very substantial increase in crime."

He

stated that it was imperative to use such techniques "in
cases vitally affecting the domestic security, or where

b~\an

life is in jeopardy" and that Department files indicated that
his two mose recent predecessors as Attorney General would
concur in this view.

President Truman signed his concurrence

on the Attorney General's letter.
According to the

Department~s

records, the annual total

of telephone wiretaps and microphones installed by the Bureau
between 1940 through 1951 was as foilows:
Telephone Wiretaps

Microphones

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
'1948
1949
1950
1951

- 6
- 67
- 304
475
- 517
- 519
- 364
- 374
- 416
- 471
- 270
285

-

6
25
88
193
198
18ft
84
81
67
75
61
75

It should be understood that these figures, as j,s the
case for the figures I have given before, are cumulative for
each year and also duplicative to some extent, since a telephone wiretap or microphone which was installed, then discontinued, but later reinstated would be counted as a ne-d
action upon reinsiatement.
In

19~2,

there were 285 telephone wiretaps, 300 in 1953,

and 322 in 1954.

Between February 1952 and May 1954, the

- 8 -
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Attorney General's position was not
phone surveillance.
General McGrath,

wl~

~o

autnorize trespassory micro-

This was the position taken by Attorney
informed the FBI that he would not approVe

the installation of trespassory microphone surveillance
because of his concern over a possible violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

FBI records indicate there were 63

microphones installed in 1952, there were 52 installed in 1953,
and there were 99 installed in 1954.

The policy against Attorney

General approval, at least in general, of trespassory microphone
surveillance was reversed by Attorney General Herbert Brownell
on May 20, 1954, in a memorandum to Director Hoover instructing
him that the Bureau was authorized to conduct trespassory
microphohe surveillances.

The Attorney General stated that

"considerations of internal security and the national safety
are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted
use of this technique in the national interest."
A memorandum from Director Hoovei to the Deputy Attorney
General on May 4, '1961, described the Bureau's practice
since 1954 as follows:

"[IJn the internal security field,

we are utilizing microphone surveillances on a restricted
basis even though trespass is necessary to assist in uncovering
the activities of Soviet intelligence agents and Communist
Party leaders.

in the interests of national safety,

304

9

microphone surveillances are also utilized on a restricted
basis, even though trespass is
criminal activities.

nec~ssary,

in uncovering major

We are using such coverage in connection

with our investigations of the clandestine activities of top
hoodlums and organized crime.

From an intelligence stand"

.

point, this investigative technique has produced results
unobtainable through other means.

The information so obtained

is treated in the same manner as information obtained from
wire taps, that is, not from the standpoint of evidentiary
value but for intelligence purposes."
The number of telephone wiretaps and microphones from
1955 through 1964 was as follows:
Microphones

TeleEhone wiretaps
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

- 214
- 164
173
166
120
-: 115
- 140
- 198
- 244
-'260

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

- 102
- 71
73
70
- 75
- 74
- 85
- 100
- 83
- 106

" ,

It appears -that there was a change in the authorization
procedu~~

for microphone surveillance in 1965.

A memorandum

of March 30, 1965, from Director Hoover to the Attorney General
states that "[iln line with

you~

suggestion this morning, I have

"

"-

already set up the procedure similar to requesting of authority
for phone taps to be utilized in requesting authority for the
placement of microphones."
President Johnson announced a policy for federal agencies
in June 1965 which.required that the interception of telephone

-
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10 -

conversatlons without the consent of one of the parties be
limited to investigations relating to national security and that
the consent of the Attorney General be obtained' in each instance.
The memorandum went on to state that use of mechanical or
electronic devices to overhear conversations not communicated by
wire is an eve'n more difficul t problem "which raises substantial
and unresolved questions of Constitutional interpretation."
The memorandum instructed each agency conducting such an investigation to consult with the Attorney General to ascertain whether
the agency's practices were fully in'accord with the law.
Subsequently, in September 1965, the Director of the FBI wrote
the Attorney General and referred to the "present atmosphere,
brought about by the unrestrained and injudicious use of
special investigative techniques by other agencies and depart-

.

rnents, resulting in Congressional and public alarm and opposition
to any activity which could in any way be termed an invasion
of privacy."

"As a consequence," the Director wrote, "we have

discontinued completely the use of microphones." The Attorney
General responded in part as follows:

"The use of wiretaps and

microphones involving trespass present" more difficult problems

...
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because of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained in court
cases and because of current jUdicial and public 'attitude regarding their use,

It is my understanding that such devices

will not be used without my authorization, although in emergency
circumstances they may be used subject to my later ratification.
At this time
confined

I

believe it desirable that all such techniques be

to the gathering of intelligence in national security

matters, and I will continue to approve all such requests in the
future as I have in the past.

I see no need to curtail any such

activities in the national security field."
'l'he policy of the Department was stated publicly

by the

Solici tor General in a supple'mental brief in the Supreme Court
in Black v. United

States~{n

1966.

Speaking of the general dele-

gation of authority by attorneys general to the Director of the
Bureau, the

~olicitor

General stated in his brief:

"An exception to the general delegation of
authority has been prescribed, since 1940, for the
interception of wire communications, which (in
addition to being limited to matte~s involving
national security or danger to human life) has required the specific authorization of the Attorney
General in each instance. No similar procedure
existed until 1965 with respect to the use of devices
such as those involved in the instant case, although
records of oral and written communications within
the Department of Justice reflect concern by Attorneys General and the Director of-the Federal Bureau
of Investigation that the use of listening devices
by agents of the government should be confined to a
strictly limited category of situations. Under Departmental practice in effect for a period of years
prior to 1963, and continuing until 1965, the Dire~tor
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was given
'~J

Sup. Ct. Docket No. 1029, October Term, 1965

..'
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authority to approve the installation of devices
such as that in question for intelligence (and not
evidentiary) purposes when required in the interests
of intern~l security or national safety, including
organized crime, kidnappings and matters wherein
human life might be at stake. . . .
Present Departmental practice, adopted in July
1965 in conformity with the policies declared by
the President on June 30, 1965, for the entire
federal establishment, prohibits the use of such
listening devices (as well as the interception of
telephone and other wire communications) in all
instances other than those involving the collection
of intelligence affecting the national security.
The specific authorization of the Attorney General
must be obtained in each instance when this exception
is invoked."
The Solicitor General made a similar statement in
another brief filed that same term again emphasizing that the
data would not be made available for prosecutorial purposes,
and that the specific authorization of the Attorney General
must be obtained in each instance when the national security is
sought to be invoked.:/ The number of telephone wiretaps and
microphones installed since 1965 are as follows:
Telephone Wiretaps
1965--233
1966:--174
1967--113
1968-- 82
1969--123
1970--102
1971--101
1972--108
1973--123
1974--190

Microphones
1965--67
1966--10
1967-- 0
1968-- 9
1969--14
1970--19
1971--16
1972--32
1973--40
1974--42

Comparable figures for the year 1975 up to October 29 are:
Telephone Wiretaps
121

!/

Microphones
24

Schipani v. United States, Sup. Ct. Docket No.504,
October Term, 1966.

",

-
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In 1968 Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act.

Title III of the Act set up a detailed

procedure for the interception of wire or oral communications.
The procedure requires the issuance of a judicial warrant, prescribes the information to be set forth in the petition to the
judge so that, among other things, he may find probable cause
that a crime has been or is about to be committed.

It requires

notification to the parties subject to the intended surveillance
within a period not more than ninety days after the

applic~tion

for an order of approval has been denied or after the termination
of the period of the order or the.period of the extension of the
order.

Upon a showing of good cause the judge may postpone the

notification.

The Act contains a. saving clause to the effect

that it does not limit the constitutional power of the President
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a
foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the·security of the United States,

or to protect

national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

Th~n in a separate sentence the proviso goes on to say,

"Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the
overthrow of the government by force or other unlawful

mean~,

against any other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the government."

or

""

"'.
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The Act specifies the conditions under which information
obtained through a presidentially authorized interception
might be received into evidence.

In speaking of this saving

clause, Justice Powell in.the Keith case in 1972 wrote:
"Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them."
In the Keith case the Supreme Court held that in the field of
internal security, if there was no foreign involvement, a
judicial warrant was required by the Fourth Amendment.

Fifteen

months after the Keith case Attorney General Richardson, in a
letter to Senator Fulbright which was publicly released by the
Departmen t, stated:

.. In general, before I approve a·ny new

application for surveillance without a warrant, I must be
convinced that it is necessary (1) to protect the nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile.acts of a foreign
power;

(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed

essential to the security of the united States; or (3) to protect
national security information against foreign intelligence
activities."
I have read the debates and the reports of the Senate
JUdiciary Committee with respect to Title III
the proviso.

an~

particularly

It may be relevant to ppint out that Senator

Philip Hart questioned and opposed the form of the proviso
reserving presidential power.

But I believe it is fair to say

that his concern was primarily, perhaps exclusively, with the
language which dealt with presidential power to take such
measures as the President deemed

".

-
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necessary to protect the United States "against any other clear
and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. "
I now come to the Department of Justice's present
position on electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant.
Under the standards and procedures e~tablished by the President,
the personal approval of the Attorney General· is required before
any non-consensual electronic surveillance may be instituted
within the United States without a judicial warrant.

All re-

quests for surveillance must be made in writing by the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and must set forth the
relevant circumstances that justify the proposed surveillance.
Both the agency and the Presidential appointee initiating the
request must be identified.

These requests come to the Attorney

General after they have gone through review procedures within
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At my request, they are then

reviewed in the Criminal Division of the Department.

Before they

come to the Attorney General, they are then examined by a special
review group which I have established within the Office of the
Attorney General.

Each request, before authorization or denial,

receives my personal attention.

Requests are only authorized

when the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect
the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power; to obtain foreign intelligence deemed

essentlnl to the SCCUrl.ty of the nntion; to protect IIi1L1.onal
8ecurity II1(ol"llll1l:l.on 1t/',III.nnt f'oroJp,n I.ntpllll',cmco ncllvllLclI; or

..

r

16 -
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to oQtain information certified as necessary for the conduct
of foreign affairs matters important to the national security
of the United States,

In addition the subject of the electronic

surveillance must be consciously assisting a foreign power
or foreign-based political group, and there must be assurance
that the 'minimum physical intrusion'necessa~y to obtain the
information sought will be used.

As these criteria will show

and as I will indicate at greater length later in discussing
current guidelines the Department of Justice follows, our
concern is with respect to foreign powers or their agents,
In a public statement made last July 9th, speaking of the
warrantless surveillances then authorized by the Department,
I said "it can be said that there are no outstanding instances
of warrantless wiretaps or electronic surveillance directed
against American citizens and none will be authorized by me
except in cases where the target of surveillance is an agent
or collaborator of a foreign power,"

This statement accurately

reflects the situation today as well.
Having described in this fashion something of the history
and conduct of the Department of Justice with respect to
telephone wiretaps and microphone installations, I should like
to remind the Committee of a point with which I began, namely,
that the factual situations to be imagined for a discussion
such as this are not only of a sensitive but a changing nature.
I do not have much to say about this except to recall some of
the language used by General Allen in his testimony before this

- 17 -

Committee.
most

The techniques of the NSA, he said, are of the

s~nsitive

and fragile character.

312

He described as the

responsibility of the NSA the interception of international
communication signals sent through the air.

He said there had

been a watch list, which among many other names, contained t.he
names of

u.s.

citizens.

Senator Tower spoke of an awesome

technology .-- a huge vacuum cleaner of communications -- which
had the potential for abuses.

General Allen pointed out that

"The United States, as part of its effort to produce foreign
intelligence, has intercepted foreign communications, analyzed r
and in some cases decoded, these

~ommunications

to produce

such foreign intelligence since the Revolutionary War."

He

said the mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence
obtained

from foreign electrical communications and also from
\

qther foreign signals such as radar.

Signals are intercepted

by many techniques and processed, sorted and analyzed by procedures which reject inappropriate or unnec~ssary signals.

He

mentioned that the interception of communications, however it
may occur, is conducted in' such a manner as to minimize the
unwanted messages.

Nevertheless, according to his statement,

many unwanted communications are potentially selected for further
processing.

He testified that subsequent processing, sorting

and selection for analysis are conducted in accordance with
strict procedures to insure immediate and, wherever possible,
automatic

"

313
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rejection of inappropriate messages.

The analysis and reporting

is accomplished only for those messages which meet specific
"

conditions and requirements for foreign intelligence.

The use

of lists of words, including individual names, subjects, locations,
et cetera, has long been one of the methods used to sort out

.•.

information of foreign intelligence value from that which is
not of interest.
General Allen mentioned a very interesting statute,
18 USC 952, to which I should like to call your particular attention.

The statute makes it a crime for anyone who by virtue

of his employment by the United States obtains any official
diplomatic code and willfully publishes or furnishes to another
without authorization any such code or any other matter which
was obtained while in the process of

trans~ission

between any

"

foreign government and its diplomatic mission in the United States.
I call this to your attention because a certain indirection is
characteristic of the development of law, whether by statute or
not, in this area.
The Committee will at once recognize that I have
not attempted to summarize General Allen's testimony, but rather
to recall it so that this extended dimension of the variety of
fact situations which we have to think about as we explore the
coverage and direction of the Fourth Amendment is at least suggested.

"
",

314
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Having attempted to provide something of a factual
base for our discussion, I turn now to the Fourth Amendment.
Let me say at once, however, that while the Fourth Amendment
can be a most important guide to values and procedures, it does
not mandate automatic solutions.
The history of the Fourth Amendment is very much
the history of the American Revolution and this nation's quest
for independence.

The Amendment is the legacy of our early years

and reflects values most cherished by the Founders.

In a direct

sense, it was a reaction to the general warrants and writs of
assistance employed by the officers of the British Crown to
rummage and ransack colonists' homes as a means to enforce anti-.
smugglinG

and customs laws.

General search warrants had been

used for centuries in England against those accused of seditious
libel and other offenses.

These warrants, sometimes judicial,

sometimes not, often general as to persons to be arrested, places
to be searched, and things to be seized, were finally condemned
·by Lor d Cam d en ~n
. 1 765 in Entic k v. C
'
*/ a d ecision 1 ater
arr~ngton,celebrated by the Supreme Court as a "landmark of English liberty
)'0', /

... one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution."The case involved a general warrant, issued by Lord Halifax as
Secretary of State, authorizing messengers to search for John
Entick and to seize his private papers and books.

Entick had

written publications criticizing the Crown and was a supporter of
John Wilkes, the famous author and editor of the North Briton whose
own publications had prompted wholesale arrests, searches, and
~/

........ ,

19 Howell's State Trials, 1029

".

,
20

seizures.

315

Entick sued for trespass and obtained a jury verdict

in his favor.

In upholding the verdict, Lord Camden observed that

if the government's power to break into and search "homes were
accepted, "the secr~t cabinets and bureaus of every subject in
this kingdom would be thrown open to the search and inspection of
a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall see fit to
charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer,
or publisher of a seditious libel. ,,~/
The practice of the general warrants, however, continued to be known in the colonies.

The writ of assistance, an

even more arbitrary and oppressive instrument than the general
warrant, was also widely used by revenue officers to detect
smuggled goods.

Unlike a general warrant, the writ of assistance

was virtually unlimited in duration and did not have to be returned
to the court upon its execution.
criminate

searc~les

It" broadly

au~horized

indis-

and seizures against any person suspected by

a customs officer 'of possessing prohibited or uncustomed goods.
The writs,

sometimes judicial, sometimes not, were usually

issued by colonial judges and vested Crown officers with'unreviewed
and unbounded discretion to break into homes, rifle drawers, and
seize privafe papers.

All officers and subjects of the Crown

were further commanded to assist in the writ's execution.

In 1761

James Otis eloquently denounced the" writs as "the worst instrumen~

of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty,

and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an
~/

19 Howell's State Trials. at 1029 .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~~?S~>

~~~~_
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English law book," since they put "the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer.

"V

Otis' fiery oration

later prompted John Adams to reflect that "then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary
claims of Great Britain.
was

Then and there the child Independence

born."~

The words of the Fourth Amendment are mostly the product
of James Madison.

His original version appeared to be directed

solely at the issuance of improper warrants.***/

Revisions

accomplished under circumstances that are still unclear transformed the Amendment into tHO separate clauses.

The change has

influenced our understanding of the nature of the rights it
protects.
reads:

As embodied in our Constitution, the Amendment

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects; against unreasonable searches and
seizures,

~

Tudor, Life of James Otis (1823), p. 66.

~

Works

ttt/

Madison's proposal read as follows:

of John Adams, X, 276.

"The rights of th~ people to be secured in
their persons, their houses, their papers,
and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated by warrants issued without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or
not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be
seized."
Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. p. 452.

r
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shall not be violated, and no

Warr~nts

shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be

seized:'

Our understanding of the purposes underlying the Fourth
Amendment has been an evolving one.

It has been shaped by

subsequent historical events, by the changing conditions

of our

modern technological society, and by the development of our own
traditions, customs, and values.

From the beginning, of course,

there has been agreement that the Amendment protects against
practices such as those of the Crown officers under the notorious
general warrants and writs of assistance.

Above all, the

Amendment safeguards the people from unlimited, undue infringement by the government on the security of persons and their
property.

.

.

But our perceptions of the language and spirit of the Amendment have gone beyond the historical wrongs the Amendment was
intended to prevent.

The Supreme Court has served as the primary

explicator of these evolving perceptions and has sought to
articulate the values the Amendment incorporates.

I believe it

is useful in our present endeavor to identify some of these
perceived values.

"
",

First, broadly considered, the Amendment speaks to the
autonomy of the individual

agai~st

society.

It seeks to

3113
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accord to each individual, albeit

impe~fectly,

a measure of

the confidentiality essential to the attainment of human
dignity.

It is a shield against indiscriminate exposure of an

individual's private affairs to the world -- an exposure which
can destroy, since it places in jeopardy the spontaneity of
thought and action on which so much depends.

As Justice

Brandeis observed in his dissent in the Olmstead case, in
the Fourth Amendment the Founders "conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone -- the most

comprehe~sive

of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."Y

Judge

Jerome Frank made the same point in a dissent in a case in
which a paid informer with a concealed microphone broadcast an
intercepted conversation to a narcotics agent.

Judge Frank

wrote that "[a] sane, decent, civilized society must provide
some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some
insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is
a man's

castle."~/

The Amendment does not protect absolutely

the privacy of an individual.
law's response to that need,

The need for privacy, and the
go beyond the ,Amendment.

But the recognition of the value of individual

autono~y

remains

close to the Amendment's core.

~

. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 471, 478 (1928).

**/ United States v. On Lee, 193, F.2d 306, 315-16 (1951),
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A parallel value has been the Amendment's special concern
with intrusions when the purpose is to obtain evidence to incriminate the victim of the search.

As the Supreme Court observed

in Boyd, which involved an attempt to compel the production of an
individual's private papers,

~t

some point the Fourth Amendment's

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination
"run almost into each other. "Y

The intrusion on an individual's

privacy has long been thought to be especially grave when the
search is based on a desire to discover incriminating

evidence.~/

The desire to incriminate may be seen as only an aggravating circumstance of the search, but it has at times proven to be a decisive factor in determining its legality.

Indeed, in Boyd the

Court declared broadly that "compelling the production of [a person's]
private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit
his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government." * ** /

y

United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

~

The concern with self-incrimination is reflected in the test
of standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. As the Court
stated in United States v. Calandra 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974):
"Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionar~ rule
(under the Fourth Amendment] has been confined
to situations where the Government seeks to use
such evidence to incriminate the victim of the
unlawful search. . . . This standing rule is
premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence, and hence the rationale for excluding
the evidence are strongest where the Government's
unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a
criminal sanction on the victim of the search."

116 U.S., at 631-32.

-
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The incriminating evidence point goes to the integrity of the
criminal justice system.

It does not necessarily settle the

issue whether the overhearing can properly take place.

It goes to

the use and purpose of the information overheard.
A'1 Additional concern of the Amendment has been the protection of freedom of thought, speech,. and religion.

The general

'warrants were used in England as a powerful instrument to suppress
what was regarded as seditious libel or non-conformity.

Wilkes

was imprisoned in the Tower and all his private papers seized
under such a warrant for his criticism of the King.

As Justice

Frankfurter inquired, dissenting in a case that concerned the
permissible scope of searches incident to arrest, "How can there
be freedom of thought or freedom of speech or freedom of religion,
if the police can, without warrant, search your house and mine
from garret to cellar.

.?"-:./

So Justice Powell stated in Keith

that "Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when
the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political

beliefs."~/

Another concern embodied in the Amendment may be found in
its second clause dealing with the warrant requirement, even
though the Fourth Amendment does not always require a warrant.
The fear is that the law enforcement qfficer, if unchecked, may
"

misuse his powers to iVlrass those who hold unpopular or simply
different views and to intrude capriciously upon the

:;

Harris v. United StLltes, 331 U.S. 145, 163 (1947).

~

United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,

314 (1972).

-

privacy of individuals.
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It is the reco'gnition of the possibility

for abuse, inherent whenever executive discretion is uncontrolled,
that gives rise to the requirement of a warrant.

That requirement

constitutes an assurance that the judgment of a neutral and detached magistrate will come to bear before the intrusion is made
and that the dEil.cision whether the privacy of the individual must
yield to a greater need of society will not be left to the executive alone.
A final value reflected in the Fourth Amendment is
revealed in its opening words:

"The r:ight of the people."

are "the people" to whom the Amendment 'refers?

Who

The Constitution

begins with the phrase, "We the People of the United States."

That

phrase has the character of words of art, denoting the power from
which the Constitution comes.

It does suggesc a special concern

for the American citizen and for those who share the responsibilities
of citizens.

The Fourth Amendment guards the right of "the people"

and it can be urbed that it was not meant to apply to foreign
nations, their agents and collaborators.

Its application may at

least take account of that difference.
The values outlined above have been embodied in the
Amendment from the beginning.

But the importance accorded a par-

ticular value has varied during the course of our history.

Some

have been thought more important or more threatened than others
at times.

When several of the values coalesce, the need for pro-

tection has been regarded as greatest.

When only one is involved,

-
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that need has been regarded as lessened.

Moreover, the scope

of the Amendment itself has been altered over time, expanding
or contracting in the face of changing circumstances and needs.
As with the evolution of other constitutional provisions, this
J>

development has been cas~' in definitional terms.

Words have

been read by different Justices and different Courts to mean
different things.

The words of the Amendment have not changed;

we, as a people, and the world which envelops us, have changed.
An important example is what the Amendment seeks to guard
as "secure."

The wording of the ,Fourth Amendment suggests a

concern with tangible property.

By' its terms, the Amendment

protects the right of the people to be secure in their "persons,
houses, papers and effects."

The emphasis appears to be on the

material possessions of a person, rather than on his privacy
generally.

The Court came to that conclusion in 1928 in the

'Olmstead case,:/

holding that the interception of

telepho~e

messages, if accomplished without a physical trespass, was outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.

Chief Justice Taft,

writing for the Court, reasoned that wiretapping did not involve
'a search or seizur:e;, the Amendment protected only tangible
material "effects" and not
tions.

intangibl~s

such as oral conversa-

A thread of the same idea can be found in Entick, where

Lord Camden said: "The great end for which men entered into
society was to secure their property."

But,

Olmstead v. united states, 277 u.s. 438.

"

te

-
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while the removal and carrying off of ,papers was a trespass
of the most

aggravat~d

sort, inspection ,alone was not:

"the

eye," Lord Camden said, "cannot by the law of England be guilty,
of a trespass."
The movement of the law since Olmstead has been steadily
from protection of property to protection of privacy.

In the

Goldman case : / in 1942 the Court held that the use of a detectaphone placed against the wall of a room to overhear oral conversations in an adjoining office was not unlawful because no
physical trespass was involved.

The opinion's unstated assumption,

however, appeared to be that a private oral conversation could
be among the protected "effects" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

The Silverman case **/ later eroded Olmstead

substantially by holding that the Amendment was violated by the
interception of an oral conversation ,through the use of a spike
mike driven into a party wall, penetrating the heating duct of
the adj acen thorne.'

The Court sta te,l that the question whether

a trespass had occurred as a technical matter of property law
was not controllini; the existence of an actual intrusion was
sufficient.
The Court finally reached the opposite emphasis from
its previous stress on property in 1967 in Katz v. United States.

***/

The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment "protects

people, not places," against unreasonable searches and seizures;
that oral conversations, although intangible, were entitled to be
secure against the uninvited ear of a government

*/
**/
***/

Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129.
365 U. S. , 505

389 U.S. 347.

(19 61) .

r

324
-

29 -

officer, and that the interception of a telephone conversation,
even if accomplished without a trespass, violated the privacy
on which petitioner justifiably relied while using a telephone
booth.

Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, explained that

to have a constitutionally protected right of privacy under
Katz

it was necessary that a person, first,

"have exhibited

an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognized as
'reasonable. '''~/
At first glance, Katz might be taken as a statement that the
Fourth Amendment now protects all reasonable expectations of privacy-- that the boundaries of the right of privacy are
with those of the Fourth Amendment.
m·isleading.

cote~inous

But that assumption would be

To begin with , the Amendment
still protects some interests
.

.

that have very little if anything to-do with privacy.
police may not, without warrant,

seiz~

,Thufi, the

an autofuobile parked on

the owner's driveway even though they have reason to believe that
the automobile was used in conunitting a crime..

The interest pro-

tected by the Fourth Amendment in such a case is puobably better
defined in terms of property than privacy.

Moreover, the Katz

opinion itself cautioned that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy. '''~''*/
Some privacy interests are protected by remaining Constitutional
guarantees.

Others are protected by federal statute, by the

states, or not at all.

~/

Id., at 361.

** / I d., at 3 50 .

"
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First,

unde~

the Court's decisions,

the Fourth Amendment does not protect every expectation of privacy,
no matter how reasonable or actual that expectation may be.

It

does not protect, for example, against false friends' betrayals
to the police of even the most private confidences.

Second, the

"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, often said to be
the test of Katz, is itself a conclusion.

It represents a judgment

that certain behavior should as a matter of law be protected against
unrestrained governmental intrusion.

That judgment, to be sure,

rests in part on an assessment of the reasonableness of the expectation, that is, on an objective," factual estimation of a risk
of intrusion under given circumstances, joined with an actual
expectation of privacy by the person involved in a particular case.
But it is plainly more than that, since it is also intermingled
with a judgment as to how important it is to society that an
expectation should'be confirmed--a jUdgment based on a perception
of our customs, traditions, and values as a free people.
The Katz decision itself illustrates the point.
really a

"reasonabl~

Was it

expectation" at the time of Katz for a person

to believe tQat his telephone conversation in a public phone
booth was private and not susceptible to interception by'a microphone on the booth's outer wall?

"Almost forty years earlier in

Olmstead the Court held that such nontrespassory interceptions
were permissible.

Goldman reaffirmed that holding.

Katz reasonably expect the contrary?

So how could

The answer, I think, is that

the Court's decision in Katz turned ultimately on an assessment of
the effect of permitting, such unrestrained intrusions on the
individual in his private and social life.

The judgment was that

"
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- 31 a license for unlimited governmental intrusions upon every

telephone would pose too great a danger to the spontaneity of
human thought and behavior.

Justice Harlan put the point this

way:
"The analysis must, in my view, transcend the
search for subjective expectations or legal
attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the
customs and values of the past and present."V
A weighing of values is an inescapable part in the interpretation and growth of the Fourth Amendment.

Expectations, and

their reasonableness, vary according to circumstances.
need for an intrusion and its likely effect.

So will the

These elements will

define the boundaries of the interests which the Amendment holds
as "secure."
To identify the interests which are to be "secure," of course,
only

be~ins

the inquiry.

It is equally

essen~ial

to identify the

dangers from which those interests are to be secure.

What consti-

tutes an intrusion will depend on the scope of the protected interest.
The early view that the Fourth Amendment protected only tangible
property resulted iri the rule that a physical trespass or taking
was the measure of an intrusion.

-:"l

Olmstead rested on the fact that

United States v. White, 401 U,S. 745, 786 (1971)
opinion) .

(dissenting

"
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there had been no physical trespass into the defendafit's
or office.

hom~

It also held that the use of the sense of hearing

to intercept a conversation did not constitute a search or seizure.
Katz, by expanding the scope of the protected interests, necessarily
altered our uRderstanding of
i~tangibles

wh~t

constitutes an intrusion

Since

such as oral conversations are now regarded as pro-

tected "effects," the overhearing of a conversation may constitute
an intrusion apart from whether a physical trespass is involved.
The nature of the search and seizure can be
very important.

An entry into a house to search its interior may

be viewed as more serious than the overhearing of a certain type
of conversation.

The risk of abuse may loom larger in one case

than the other.

The factors that have come to be viewed as most

~portant,

however, are the purpose and effect of the intrusion.

The Supreme Court has tended to focus not so much on what was
physically done, but on why it was done and what the consequence
is likely to be.

What is seized, why it was seized, and what is

done with what is seized are critical questions.
I stated earlier that a central concern of the Fourth Amendment was with intrusions to obtain evidence to incriminate the
victim of the search.
.~urt

This concern has been reflected in Supreme

decisions which have traditionally

tr~ated

:gather incriminatory evidence differently from
i

intrusions to

intrusions for

•

~neutral

or benign purposes.

t

In Frank v.

Maryland,~/

the appellant

:ws fined for refusing to allow a housing inspector to enter his

\
~

359 u.S. 360 (1959).
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residence to determine whether it was maintained in compliance
with the municipal housing code.
have led only to

.~

Violation of the code would

direction to remove the violation.

Only'

fnilure to ca:lply wi tIl the direction woultl lead to n cLi llI.inal
ntlJlcLlolI.

'I'lin Cuurt:. Illlid LlInl: ouch IHll11ll1lnll;ilLlvn fll'i1II~III':1

could IJC! cOIHlucLcd wl.L1luut Wi.IJ.Tlll1l:..

JunLJ.co 1"fnllkfurt.('I, wrJ.tJIl(J

for the Court, noted that the Fourth Amendment was a reaction to
"ransacking by Crown officers of the homes of citizens in search
of evidence of crime or of illegally imported

goods."~

He

observed that both Entick and Boyd were concerned with attempts
to compel individuals to incriminate themselves in criminal
cases and that "it was on the issue of the right to

**/

Id., at 363.

"
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be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought.""!:.../

There was thus a great difference,

the Justice said, between searches to seize evidence for criminal
prosecutions and searches to detect the existence of municipal health
code violations.
I

adjunct to a

Searches in this later category, conducted "as an

regu~atory

scheme for the general welfare of the community

and not as a means of enforcing the criminal law, [have] antecedents
deep in our history," and should not be subjected to the warrant
requirement. ~'n'( /
Frank was later overruled in 1967 in Camara v. Municipal Court,***/
and a companion case, See v. City of

Seattle.*"(~'d(/

In Camara, appellant

was, like Frank, charged with a criminal violation as a result of his
refusal to permit a municipal inspector to enter his apartment to
\

investi~ate

possible violations of the city's housing code.

The

Supreme Court rejected the Frank rationale that municipal fire,
health, and housing inspections could be conductetwithout a warrant
because the object of the intrusion was not to search for the fruits

or instrumentalities of crime.

Moreover, the Court noted that

most regulatory laws such as f{re, health, and housing codes were

y

Id., at 365.

*!..I

*!!..I
~/

I d., at 3 6 7 .

387

u. S. 523.

387 u.S. 541.
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enforced by criminal processes, that refusal to permit entry to an
inspector was often a criminal offense, and that the "selfprotection" or "non-incrimination" objective of the Fourth
Amendment

was therefore indeed involved.

Bue the doctrine of Camara proved to be limited.

In 1971

in Wyman v. James */ the Court held that a "home visit" by a
·welfare caseworker, which entailed termination of benefits if
the welfare recipient refused entry, was lawful despite the
absence of a warrant.

The Court relied on the importance of

the public's interest in obtaining information about the recipient, the reasonableness of the measures taken to ensure that the
intrusion was limited to the extent practicable, and most
importantly, the fact that the primary objective of the search
was not to obtain evidence for a criminal investigation or
prosecution.

Camara and Frank were distinguished as involving

criminal proceedings.
Perhaps what these cases mainly say is that the purpose of
the intrusion, and the use to which what is seized is put, are
more important from a constitutional standpoint than the physical
act of intrusion itself.

Where the purpose or effect is non-

criminal, the search and seizure is perceived as less troublesome and there is a readiness to find reasonableness even in
the absence of a judicial warrant.

By

contrast, where the

purpose of the intrusion is to gather incriminatory evidence,
and hence hostile, or when the consequence of the intrusion
is the sanction of the criminal law,. greater protections may
be given.

36
The Fourth Amendment then, as it has always been inter-
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preted, does not give absolute protection against Government
intrusion.

In the words of the Amendment, the right guaranteed

is security against' unreasonable searches and seizures.

As

Justice White said in the Camara case, "there can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails."~/

Whether there has been a constitutionally pro-

hibited invasion at all has come to depend less on an absolute
dividing line between protected and unprotected areas, and
more on an estimation of the individual security interests
affected by the Government's actions.

Those effects, in turn,

may depend on the purpose for which the search is made, whether
it is hostile, neutral, or benign in relation to the person whose
interests are invaded, and also on the manner of the search.
By the same token, the Government's need to search, to
invade individual privacy interests, is no longer measured
exclusively -- if indeed it ever was
probable cause standard.

by the traditional

The second clause of the Amendment

states, in part, that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause."

Th~'

concept of probable cause has often been read to

bear upon and in many cases to control the question of the
reasonableness of searches, whether'with or without warrant.
The ,tradi tiona 1 formula tion of the standard, as "reasonable
grounds for believing

~/

l.

387

u.s.

523, 536-37

(1967).

3)2
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that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched "
relates to the Governmental interest in the prevention of criminal
offenses, and to seizure of their instruments and fruits.~/

This.

formulation once took content from the long-standing "mere evi.dence rule" -- that searches could not be undertaken "solely
fOT the purpose of . . . [securing] evidence to be used . . . in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to
only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be fourllQ:·
in the interest which the public . . . may have in the property to
be seized."**/

The Government's interest in the intrusion, like

the individual's interest in privacy, thus was defined in terms
of property, and the right to search

as well as to seize

was

limited to items -- contraband and the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime -- in which the Government's interest was thought superior
to the individual's.

This notion, long eroded in practice, was

expressly abandoned by the Court in 1967 in Warden v. Hayden.
Thus, the detection of crime -- the need to discover and use
"mere evidence" -- may presently justify intrusion.
Moreover, as I have indicated, the Court has held that, in

,

I
l
t

I
f
~

certain situations, something less than probable cause -- in th'2
traditional sense -- may be sufficient ground for intrusion, if
the degree of intrusion is limited strictly to the purposes for
which it is made.

In Terry v. Ohio ,\-)\-* / the Court held that a

t

I

I
~

~I

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 1975 (1949).

**1 Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. ·298, 309 (1921).
~I

392 U. S. 1 ( 19 6 8 )
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policeman, in order to protect himsel£ and others nearby, may
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when he has
reasonable grounds for believing that criminal conduct is taking
place and that the person searched is armed and dangerous.

Last

term, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce ,~j the Court held that.
if an officer has a "founded suspicion" that a car in a border
area contains illegal aliens, the officer may stop the car and
ask the occupants to explain suspicious circumstances.

The

Court concluded that the important Governmental interest involved,
and the absence of practical alternatives, justified the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop.

In both Terry and Brignoni, the Court

emphasized that a more drastic intrusion -- a thorough search
of the suspect or automobile -- would
of traditional probable cause.

r~quire

the justification

This point is reflected in the

Court's decisions in Almeida-Sanchez ** 1 and Ortiz, *** 1 in ~lhich

.

the Court held that, despite the interest in stemming illegal
innnigration, searches of automobiles' either at fixed checkpoints
or by roving patrols
equivalent" of borders.

in places that are not the "functional
could not be undertaken without probable

cause.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the traditional probable cause
standard is not the exclusive measure of the Government's interest.
~I
~I

***1

The kind and degree of interest required depend on the
U.S.

(1975).

413 U. s. 266 ( 19 73) .

U.s.

(1975).
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severity of the intrusion the Goverhment seeks to make.

The

requirement of the probable cause standard itself may vary, as
the Court made clear in Camara.:/

That case, as you recall,

concerned the nature of the probable cause requirement in the
context of searches to identify housing code violations.

The

Court was persuaded that the only workable method of enforcement
was periodic inspection of all structures, and concluded that
because the search was not "personal in nature," and the invasion
of privacy involved was limited, probable cause could be based
on "appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole," rather than
knowledge of the condition of particular buildings.

"If a valid

public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated," the court
stated, "then there is probable cause to issue a suitable restricted
search warrant."::/

In the Keith case, while holding that domestic

national. security surveillanc€--- not involving the activities
of
.
foreign powers and their agents-- was subject to the warrant. requirement, the Court noted that the reasons for such domestic
surveillance may differ from those justifying surveillances for
ordinary crimes, and that domestic security surveillances often
have to be lonq range projects.

For these reasons, a standard of

probable cause to obtain a warrant different from the traditional
standard would be justified: "Different standards may be compatible
with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to

y

387 U.S. 523 (1967).

**/

Id., at 539

40
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the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information
and the protected rights of our citizens."***/
In brief, alttough at one time the "reasonableness" of
a search may have been defined according to the traditional
probable cause standard, the situation has now. been reversed.
Probable cause has come to depend on reasonableness

on the

legitimate need of the Government and whether there is reason
to believe that the precise intrusion sought, measured in terms
of its effect on individual security, is necessary to satisfy it.

***/

407

u.s.

297, 322-23 (1972).

J,3G
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This point is critical in evaluating the reasonableness of
searches or surveillances undertaken to protect national security.
In some instances, the Government's interest may be, in part, to
protect the nation

against specific actions of foreign powers

or their agents -- actions that are

crimin~

offenses.

In other

instances, the interest may be to protect against the possibility
of actions by foreign powers and their agents dangerous to national
security -- actions that mayor may not be criminal.

Or the interest

may be solely to gather intelligence, in a variety of forms, in the
hands of foreign agents and foreign powers -- intelligence that
may be essential to informed conduct of our nation's foreign affairs.
This last interest indeed may often be far more critical for the
protection of the nation than the detection of a particular criminal
offense.

The Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness as it
..

has developed in the Court's decisions is sufficiently flexible to
recognize this.
Just as the reasonableness standard of the Amendment's first
clause has taken content frcim the probable clause standard, so it
has also come to incorporate the particularity requirement of the
warrant clause -- that warrants particularly describe "the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
~ircuit Court has written,

As one

although pointing out the remedy might not
De very extensive, H[i.]ituitations on the fruit to t--.e ~athererl.
tend to limit the quest itself."~/·

~

United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911, 914

_.....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-- - -

-

-~-

(CA2, 1930)
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The Government's interest and purpose in undertaking the search
defines'its scope, and the societal importance of, that purpose
can be weighed against the effects of the intrusion on the individual.

By precise definition of the objects of the search, the

degree of intrusion can be minimized to that reasonably necessary to

ach~eve

the legitimate purpose.

In this sense, the

particularity requirement of the warrant clause is analogous to
the minimization requirement of Title 111,*/ that interceptions
"be executed in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception" under the Title.
But there is a distinct aspect to the particularity requirernent--one that is often overlooked.

An officer who has obtained

a warrant based upon probable cause to search for particular
items may in conducting the search

necessarily have to examine

other items, some of which may constitute evidence of an entirely
distinct crime.

The normal rule under the plain view doctrine is

that the officer may seize the latter incriminating items as well
as those specifically identified in the warrant so long as the scope
of the authorized search is not exceeded.

The minimization rule

responds to the concern about overly broad searches, and i,t requires
an effort to limit what can be seized.
limit how it can be used.

It also may be an attempt to

Indeed, this minimization concern may have

been the original purpose of the "mere evidence" rule.

The concern about the use of what
ant for future actions.

*!:...!

18 U.S.C.

§

seized may be most

Until very recently--in fact, until

Court's 1971 decision in Bivens **/

~

i~

impo~t

the

the only sanction against

2518 (5).

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents 1",03 U. S. 388.

338
'43

an illegal search was that its fruits were inadmissible at any
criminal trial of the person whose interest was invaded.

So long

as this was the only sanction, the courts, in judging reasonableness, did not really have to weigh any governmental interest other
than that or detecting crimes.

In practical effect, a search

could only be "unreasonable" as a matter of law if an attempt was
made to use its fruits for prosecution of a criminal offense.

So

long as the Government did not attempt ·such use, the search could
continue and the Government's interests, other than enforcing
criminal laws, could be satisfied.
It may be said that this confuses rights and remedies; searches
could be unreasonable even though no sanction followed.

But I

am not clear that this is theoretically so, and realistically it
was not so.

As I have noted earlier, the reasonableness of a

search has depended, in major part, on the purpose

f~r

which it

is undertaken and on whether that purpose, in relation to the
person whom it affects, is hostile or benigh.

The search most

hostile to an individual is one in preparation for his criminal
prosecution.

Exclusion of evidence from criminal trials may .

help assure that searches undertaken for ostensibly benign motives
are not used as blinds for attempts to find criminal evidence,
while permitting searches that are genuinely benign to continue.
But there is a more general point.

The effect of a Government

intrusion on individual security is a function, not only of the
intrusion's nature and circumstances, but also of disclosure and
of the use to which its product is put . . Its effects are, perhaps

'

..
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greatest when it is employed or can be employed to impose
criminal sanctions or to deter, by disclosure, the exercise of
individual freedoms.

In short, the use of the product seized

bears upon the reasonableness of the search.
These observations have particular bearing on electronic
surveillance.

By the nature of the technology the "search" may

necessarily be far broader than its legitimate objects.
exampl~,

For

a surveillance justified as the only means of obtaining

valuable foreign intelligence may require the temporary overhearing
of conversations containing no foreign intelligence whatever in
order eventually to locate its object.

To the extent that we

can, by purely mechanical means, select out only that information that
fits the purpose of the search, the. intrusion is radically reduced.
Indeed, in terms of effects on individual
be no intrustion at all.

securi~y,

''I

there would

But other steps may be appropriate.

In

this respect; I think we should recall the language and the practice for many years under former § 605 of the Communications Act.
The Act was violated, not

~

surveillance alone, but only by surveil-

lance and disclosure in court or to the ·public.

It may be that

if a·critical Governmental purpose justifies a surveillance, but
because of technological limitations it is not possible to limit
surveillance strictly to those persons as to whom alone surveil-

1
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lance is justified, one way of reducing the intrusion's effects
is to limit strictly the revelation or disclosure or the use of
its product.

Minimization procedures can be very important.

In discussing the standard of reasonableness, I have necessarily described the evolving standards for issuing warrants
and the sta~dards governing their scope.

But I have not yet dis-

cussed the warrant requirement itself -- how it relates to the
reasonableness standard and what purposes it was intended to serve.
The relationship of the warrant ,requirement to the reasonableness
standard was described by Justice 'Robert Jackson:

"Anyassump-

tion that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify
the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce
the Amendment to a nullity and ,leave the people's 'homes secure
only in· the discretion of police officers. .• . .

When the right

of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent.'~/This view has not always been
accepted by a majority of the Court; the Court's view of the relationship between the general reasonableness standard and the
warrant requirement has shifted often and dramatically.

But

the view expressed by Justice Jackson is now quite clearly the
prevailing position.

The Court said in Katz that "searches con-

ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
~/

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.s. ,10, 13-14 (1948).
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Amendment -- subject "only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated

exceptions."~./

Such exceptions include those

grounded in necessity -- where exigencies of time and circumstance make resort to a magistrate practically impossible.

These

include, of course, the Terry stop and frisk and, to some degree,
searches incident to arrest.

But there are other exceptions,

not always grounded in exigency -- for example, some automobile
searches -- and at least some kinds of searches not conducted
for purposes of enforcing criminal laws -- such as the welfare
visits of Wyman v. James.

In short, the warrant requirement

itself depends on the purpose and degree of intrusion.

A foot-

note to the majority opinion in Katz, as well as Justice White's
concurring opinion, left open the possibility that warrants may
not be required for searches undertaken for national security
purposes.

And, of course, Justice Powell's opinion in Keith,

while requiring warrants for domestic security surveillances,
suggests that a different balance may be struck when the surveillance is undertaken against foreign powers and their agents
to gather intelligence information or to protect against foreign
" threats.
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to guard against
over-zealousness of Government officials, who may tend to overestimate the basis and necessity of intrusion and to underestimate the impact of their efforts on individuals.

"The his-

torical judgment, which the Fourth "Amendment accepts, is th<lt

V

389 U.S.

347, 357

(1967).
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unreviewed executive discretion

ma~'yield

too readily to

pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected

speech."~/·

These pur-

poses of the warrant requirement must be kept firmly in mind
in analyzing the appropriateness of applying it to the foreign
intelligence and security area.
There is a real possibility that application of the
w?rrant requirement, at least in the form of the nonnal criainal
search warrant, the form adopted. in Title III, will endanger
legitimate Government interests.

As I have indicated, Title III

sets up a detailed procedure for interception of wire or oral
communications.

It requires the procurement of a judicial

warrant and prescribes the information to be set forth in the
petition to the judge so that, among other thlngs,.he may
find prQbably cause that a crime has been or is about to ,be
committed.

It requires notification to the parties subject to

the surveillance within a period after it has taken place.

The

statute is clearly unsuited to protection of the vital natiffilal
interests in continuing detection of the activities of foreign
powers and their agents.

A notice requirement -- aside

fro~

other possible repercussions -- could destroy the usefulness of

~I

United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
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intelligence sources and methods.
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The most critical surveil-

lance in this area may have nothing whatever to do with detection
of crime.
Apart from the problems presented by particular provisions
of Title 1"11, the argument against application of the warrant
requirement, even with an expanded probable cause standard, is that
judges and magistrates may underestimate the importance of the Government's need, or that the information necessary to make that determina tion cannot be disclosed to a judge or lIIug is tra U! w.llhou t
risk of its accidental revelation -- a revelation that could work
great harm to the nation's security.

What is often less likely

to be noted is that a magistrate may be as prone to overestimate
as to underestimate the force of the Government's need.
necessarily are issued ex parte;

Warrants

often decision must come quickly

on the basis of information that must remain confidential.

Appli-

cations to anyone judge or magistrate would be only sporadic;
no opinion could be published; this would limit the growth of
judicially developed, reasonably uniform standards based, in part,
on the quality of-the information sought and the knowledge of
possible alternatives. Equally important, responsibility for the
been
intrusion would have/diffused.
It is possible that the actual
number of searches or surveillances would increase if executive
officials, rather than bearing responsibility themselves, can find
shield behind a magistrate's judgment of reasonableness.

On the

other hand, whatever the practical effect of a warrant requirement
may be, it would still serve the important purpose of assuring the
public that searches are not conducted without the approval of a
neutral magistrate who could

preven~

abuses of the technique.
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In discussing the advisability of a warrant requirement,

it may also be useful to distinguish among possible situations
that arise in the national security area.
greatly simplified--come to mind.

Three'situations--

They differ from one another

in the extent to which they are limited in time or in target.
First, the "search may be directed at a particular foreign
agent to detect a specific anticipated activity--such as the
purchase of a secret document.
detected ordinarily would

The activity which is to be

const~tute

a crime.

Second, the

search may be more extended in time--even virtually continuous-but still would be directed at an ldentified foreign agent.
The purpose of such a surveillance would be to monitor the
agent's activities, determine the identities of persons whose
access to classified information he might be exploiting,
and

de~ermine

the identity of other foreign agents with

he may be in contact.

~hom

Such a surveillance might also gather

foreign intelligence information

~bout

the agent's own country,

information that would be of positive intelligence value to
the united States.' Third, there may be virtually continuous
surveillance which by its nature d08s not have specifically
pre-determined targets.

Such a surveillance could be designed

to gather foreign intelligence information essential to the
security of the nation.
The more limi ted in time a'nd target a surveillance is,
the more nearly analogous it appears to be with a traditional

-'50 -
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criminal search which involves a particular target location
or individual at a specific time.

Thus, the first situation I

just described wouJd in that respect be most amenable to
some sort of warrant requirement, the second less so.

The

efficacy of a warrant requirement in the third. situation
would be minimal.

If the third type of surveillance I described

were submitted to prior judicial approval, that judicial
decision would take the form of an ex parte declaration that
the program of surveillance designed, by the Government strikes
a reasonabJ,e balance between the government1s need for the'
information and the protection of individuals' rights.

Never-

theless, it may be that different kinds of warrants could be
developed to cover the third situation.
Almeida-Sanchez,~Justice

In his opinion in

Powell suggested the possibility of

area warrants--issued on the basis of the conditions in the
area to be surveilled--to allow automobile searches in areas
near America's borders.
and it might be

poss~ble

The law has not lost its inventiveness,
to fashion new judicial approaches to

the novel situations that come up in the area of foreign
intelligence.

I think it must be pointed out that for the

development of such an extended, new kind of warrant, ·a statutory
base might be required or at least appropriate.

At the same

time, in dealing with this area, it may be mistaken to focus
on the warrant requirement alone to the exclusion of other,
possibly more realistic, protections.

y

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973).
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What, then, is the shape of the present law?
with, several statutes appear to

reco~nize

To begin

that the Government
inte~ligence

purposes

and that this activity must be, and can be, carried out.

Section

does intercept certain messages for foreign

952 of Title 18, which I mentioned earlier is one example;
section 798 of the same title is another.

In addition, Title

Ill's proviso, which I have quoted earlier, explicitly
disclaimed any intent to limit the authority of the Executive
to cbnduct electronic surveillance for national security and
foreign intelligence purposes.

In

~n

the power would be exercized, Title

apparent recognition that

I~I

specifies the conditions

under which information obtained through Presidentially authorized
surveillance may be received into evidence.
It seems clear,
,
therefore, that in 1968 Congress was not prepared to come to a
judgment that the Executive should discontinue its activities

.

in this area, nor was it prepared to regulate how those activities
were to be conducted.

Yet it cannot be said that Congress has

been entirely silent on this matter.

Its express statutory

references to the existence·of the activity must be taken into
account.

.

The case law, although unsatisfactory in some respects,
has supported or left untouched the policy of the Executive miliefure~
intelligence area whenever the issue has been squarely confronted.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Keith case in 1972 concerned
the legality of warrantless surveillance directed against a

,

r

52

347

domestic organization with no connection to a foreign power
and the Government's attempt to introduce the product of the
surveillance as evidence in the criminal trial of a person charged
with bombing a C.I.A. office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

In part

because of the danger that uncontrolled discretion might result

.

.

in use of electronic surveillance to deter domestic organizations
from exercising First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court held
that in cases of internal security, when there is no foreign
involvement, a judicial warrant is required.

Speaking for the

Court, Justice Powell emphasized that "this case involves only
the domestic aspects of national security.

We have expressed

no opinion as to the issues which may be involved with respect

~ activities of foreign powers or their agents.'~/AS I observed
in my remarks at the ABA convention, the Supreme Court surely
realized, "in view of the importance the Government has placed
on the need for warrantless electronic surveillance that, after
ilie holding in Keith, the Government would proceed with the
procedures it had developed to conduct those surveillances not
prohibi'ted--that is, in the foreign intelligence area or, as
Justice Powell said; 'with respect to activities of foreign
powers and their agents.'"
The two federal circuit court decisions after Keith that
~ve

,

expressly addressed the problem have both held that the Fourth

:AIIendment does not require a warrant for electronic surveillance
~~stituted to obtain foreign intelligence.
,

In the first, United

**,

States v. Brown ,_,the defendant, an American citizen, was incidentally
as the result of a warrantless wiretap authorized by the

""! •

407 U.S., 322
484 F.2d 418 (CAS,

1973), cert. denied 41S U.S. 960 (1974).

,
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Attorney General for foreign intelligence purposes.

In upholding

the legality of the .surveillance, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit declared that

on the basis of "the President's

constitutional dut> to act for the United States in the field
of foreign affairs, and his inherent power to protect national
security in the conduct of foreign affairs ... the President may
constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose
of gathering foreign intelligence."

The court added that

"(r) es tric tiOllS on the President's power which are appropriate
in cases of domestic security become

~nappropriate

in the context

of the international sphere."
In United S ta tes v. Butenko :lthe Third Circuit reached the
same conclusion--thatthe warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to electronic surveillance undertaken for
foreign intelligence purposes.

Although the surveillance in that

case was directed at a foreign agent, the court held broadly that
the warrantless surveillance would be lawful so long as the primary
purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence information.
stated that such

s~rveillance

The court

would be reasonable without a warrant

even though it might involve the overhearing of conversations of
"alien officials and agents, and perhaps of American citizens."
the United States
should note that although /
prevailed in the Butenko c~sei the

I

Department acquiesced in the petitioner's application for certiorari
in order to obtain the Supreme Court's ruling on the question.
The. Supreme Court denied review, however, and thus left the Third
Circuit's decision undisturbed as the prevailing law.
Most recently, in Zweibon v.

.

,"*'

Mitchell~ecided

in June of

~l 494 F.2d 593 (CA3) (en bane) cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v.
Uniterl States, 6.19 ,11.S. A8l (l~7/~) .
~I

516 F.2d 594 (CADC, 1975)

(~.

bane).
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this year, the District of Columbia Circuit dealt with warrantless
electronic surveillance directed against a domestic organization
allegedly engaged in activities affecting this country's relations
with a foreign power.

Judge Skelly Wright's opinion for

four of the Qine judges makes many statements questioning any
national security exception to the warrant requirement.

The

court's actual holding made clear in Judge Wright's opinion was
far narrower and, in fact, is consistent with holdings in Brown
and Butenko.

The court held only that "a warrant must be obtained

before a wiretap is installed on a domestic organization that is
neither the agent of nor acting
power."

~n

collaboration with a foreign

This holding, I should add, was fully consistent with

the Department of Justice's policy prior to the time of the
Zweibon decision.
Wit6 these cases in mind, it is fair to say elect~onic·
surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, essential
to the national security, is lawful under the Fourth Amendment,
even in the absence of a warrant, at least where the subject of
the surveillance

ii

of a foreign power.

a foreign power or an agent or collaborator
Moreover, the opinions of two circuit courts

stress the purpose for which the surveillance is undertaken,
rather than the identity of the subject.

This suggests that

in their view such surveillance without a warrant is lawful so
long as its purpose is to obtain foreign intelligence.

)5

J:.JI}

But the legality of the activity does not remove from the
Executive or from Congress the responsibility to take steps, within
their power, to seek an accommodation between the vital public and
private interests involved.

In our effort to seek such an

accommodation, ,the Department has adopted standards and procedures
designed to ensure the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of
electronic surveillance and to minimize to the extent practical
the intrusion on individual interests.
Department's policy to authorize

As I have stated, it is the

elec~ronic

surveillance for foreign

intelligence purposes only when the subject
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
"agent" I mean a conscious agent; the

ag~ncy

By the term

must be of a special

kind ,and must relate to activities of great concern to the United

States for foreign intelligence or cOllnterintelligC'llce rC'Clsons .
•

In addition, at present, there is no warrantless eleclronic
surveillance directed against any 1\merican citizen, and although

it is conceivable that circumstances justifying such surveillance
may arise in the

futur~,

I will not authorize the surveillance

unless it is clear that the American citizen is an active, conscious
agent or collaborator of a foreign power.

In no event, of course,

would I authorize any warrantless surveillance against domestic
persons or organizations such as those involved in the Keith case.
Surveillance without a warrant will. not be conducted for purposes

of
, security against domestic or internal threats.

It is our policy,

f

~reover,

to use the Title III procedure whenever it is possible and.

------ -

---

.. -
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appropriate to do so, although the statutory provisions regarding
probable cause, notification, and prosecutive purpose make it
unworkable in all foreign intelligence and many counterintelligence
cases.
The sta~dards and procedures that the Department has established
within the United States seek to

ensur~

that every request for

surveillance receives thorough and impartial consideration before
a decision is made whether to institute it.

The process is elaborate

and time-consuming, but it is necessary if the public interest is
to be served and individual rights safeguarded.
I have just been speaking about telephone wiretapping and
General~

microphone surveillances which are reviewed by the Attorney
In the course of its investigation, the Committee has become

familiar with the more technologically sophisticated and complex
electronic surveillance activities of other agencies.

These

surveillance activities present somewhat different legal questions.
The communications conceivably might take place entirely outside
the United States.

That fact alone, of course, would not automati-

cally remove the agencies' activities from scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment since at times even communications abroad may
involve a legitimate privacy interest of American citizens.

Other

communications conceivably might be exclusively between foreign
powers and their agents and involve no American terminal.

In such a

case, even though American citizens may be discussed, this may raise
less significant, or perhaps no significant, questions under the

l
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Fourth Amendment.

But the primary concern, I suppose, is whether

reasonable minimization procedures are employed with respect to use
and dissemination.
With respect to all electronic surveillance, whether conducted
within the United States or abroad, it is essential that efforts
be made to minimize as much as possible the extent of the intrusion.
Much in this regard can be done by modern technology.

Standards and

procedures can be developed and effectively deployed to limit the
scope of the intrusion and the use to which its product is put.
Various mechanisms can provide a needed assurance to the American
people that the activity is undertaken for legitimate foreign
intelligence purposes, and not for political
or other improper purposes.

The procedures used should not be ones

which by indirection in fact target American citizens and resident
; aliens where these individuals would not themselves be appropriate
targets.

The proper minimization criteria can limit the activity

to its justifiable and necessary scope.
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Another factor must be recognized.

It is the importance

or potential importance of the information to be
secured.

The activity may be undertaken to obtain information

deemed necessary to protect the nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power,
to obtain fo~eign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States, cir to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Need is itself a matter of degree.

It may be that

the importance of some information is slight, but that may be
impossible to gauge in advance; the significance of a single
bit of information may become apparent only when joined .to
intelligence from other sources.
to deal in probabilities.

In short, it is necessary

The importance of information

gathered from foreign establishments and agents may be regarded
generally as high -- although even here there may be wide
variations.

At the same time, the effect on individual

liberty and security -- at least of American citizens -caused by methods directed exclusively to foreign agents,
particularly with 'minimization procedures, would be very

slight.
There may be regulatory and institutional devices other
than the warrant requirant that would better assure that
intrusions for national security and

forei~n

intelligence

purposes reasonably balance the important needs of Government
and of individual interests.

In assessing possible approaches

35~

59 to this problem i t may be useful to examine the practices of
other Western democracies.
West Germany each

E~are

For.example, England, Canada, and

our concern about the confidentiality

of communications within their borders.

Yet each recognizes

the right of the Executive to intercept communications without a judicial warrant in cases involving suspected espionage,
subversion or other national security intelligence matters.
In Canada and West Germany, which have statutes analogous
to Title III, the Executive in natiorial security cases is
exempt by statute from the requirement that judicial warrants
be obtained to authorize surveillance of communications.

In

England, where judicial warrants are not required to authorize
surveillance of communications in criminal investigations,
the relevant statutes recognize an

~nherent

authority in the

Executive to authorize such surveillance in national security

*/
cases . -

In each country, this authority is deemed to cover

interception of mail and telegrams, as well as telephone
conversations.
In all three countries, requests for national security
surveillanc~

may be made by the nation's intelligence agencies.

In each, a Cabinet member is authorized to grant the
~/

r~quest.

Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed
to inquire into the interception of communications
(1957), which states, at page 5, that, liThe origin of
the power to intercept communications can only be surmised, but the power has been exercised from very early
times; and has been recognised as a lawful power by a .
succession of statutes covering the last 200 years or
more."
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In England and West Germany, however, interception of communications is intended to be a last

re~ort,

used only when the

information being sought is likely to be unobtainable by any
other means.

It is interesting to note, however, that both

Canada and West Germany do require the Executive to report
periodically to the Legislature on its national security surveillance activities.

In Canada, the Solicitor General files

an annual report with the Parliament setting forth the number
of national security surveillances initiated, their average
length, a general description of the methods of interception
or seizure used, and an'assessment of their utility.
It may be that we can draw on these practices of other
Western democracies, with appropriate adjustments to fit our
system of separation of powers.

The procedures and stan0ards

that should govern the use of electronic methods of obtaining
foreign intelligence and of guarding against foreign threats
are matters of public policy and values.

They are of critical

concern to the Executive Branch and to Congress, as well as
to the courts.

The Fourth Amendment itself is a reflection

of public policy and values -- an evolving accommodation
ootween governmental needs and the necessity of protecting
l~ividua~

security and rights.

of these problems is of paramount

General public understanding
importanc~,

to assure that

~.

neither the Executive, nor the Congress, nor the courts risk

ti

~lscounting the vital interests on both sides.

\
,"

"
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The problems are not siMple.

'-

Evolving solutions probably

will and should come -- as they have in the past. -- from a
combination of legislation, court decisions, and executive
actions.

The law in this area, as Lord Devlin once described

*/

the law of search in England, "is haphazard an~ ill defined."-

It recognizes the existence and the necessity of the Executive's
power.

But the Executive and the Legislature are, as Lord

Devlin also said, "expected to act reasonably."

The future

course of the law will depend on whether we can meet that
obligation.

~/

.

Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England, 53 (1960).
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